Bianca L. Adair The Austrian State Treaty and Austro-Hungarian Relations,

1955-56¹

Historical Identity and Policy Preferences

On 1 November 1956, Prime Minister Imre Nagy announced the withdrawal of Hungary from the Warsaw Pact and its identification as a "free, independent, democratic and neutral" state² .

Did this announcement come only because the Red Army was about to begin its invasion of Hungary? What other influences shaped the desperate decision? To address what influenced Nagy's announcement, the research focuses on the foreign policy preferences of the reformers during the Revolution by examining the impact that the Austrian State Treaty and Austria's declaration of neutrality had on the debates leading to and during the first phase of the uprising. The research centers on the thesis that the independent and neutral status of Austria helped shape the preferences that drove the Revolution because of the connection between the historic neighbors.

With the collapse of the Soviet Union, researchers work to understand the nature of the political environment in Central Europe. Some scholars attribute the emerging political culture in post-communist Europe to the development of national identities influenced by the communist period³ . Other researchers emphasize the historic connections between the East and West at the crossroads of Central Europe as residual cultural links to western civilization despite communism⁴ . Admittedly, the Soviet Union dominated the eastern bloc for over forty years, while Germany remains one of the most politically and economically influential states in Central Europe. Yet for centuries, the Austrian Empire controlled the territory and nations that comprise much of the region. Moreover, when the Austro-Hungarian Empire was dismantled, newly created successor states relied heavily on the Austrian model of institution building and bureaucracy⁵ . Consequently, leading to the Second World War, Austria retained institutional and cultural linkages to former peripheral regions; Vienna remained a standard of success and leadership⁶ . After the occupation of the eastern bloc states at the end of the Second World War, the links between Austria and Eastern Europe were broken, but not destroyed. For example, the interpretation of the shared history of the Magyars and Habsburgs fluctuated: From 1945 through 1955, the communist leadership with the Habsburgs during the Ausgleich to increase the legitimacy of the international identity of communists with the Soviet Union. But by 1956, that negative view shifted to an emphasis on the positive aspects of Habsburg relations during the dual monarchy⁷ . Since then, Hungarians have maintained a positive image of Austrians and their shared past. How did this relationship survive the re-orientation of Hungarian society under communism?

The president connection between Austria and Hungary remained because of their common historic identity. Historic identity is associated with aspects of shared history that allow individuals and communities to embrace the past to make sense of the present. The past supplies some validation of "present attitudes and actions by affirming their resemblance to former ones," providing legitimacy to current practices with preferences to tradition. This referencing of tradition gives meaning, purpose, and value to the actions taken, where the identification with the past builds sentiment against subjugation or for a ruling power⁸ . Consequently, the Austro-Hungarian past became a means for Hungarians to assess their situation from 1945 through 1955. Not only did the historical identity manifest itself latently as a means of comparison, but the common heritage also emerged between 1955 and 1956 from dissidents and reformers framing policy preferences and providing legitimacy to those preferences by referring to tradition. Such references were laden with literal and symbolic meanings through which elites and the citizenry expressed policy preferences influenced by the political culture that permeated the institutional structures and drove the regime despite systemic restraints⁹ .

In communist Hungary, systemic formality and informality persisted in two forms of expression - the restricted code of the communists backed by the coercive resources of the Soviet Union and the rules based on cultural tradition¹⁰ . During periods of closed public space like Stalinism, suppressed traditions endured alongside the newer values imparted by the communist leadership¹¹ . But the Stalinist period of repression was not long enough to eradicate the social patterns of behavior and association to political bodies established prior to the dominance of the Soviet Union¹² . As a result, during periods of opened public space, such as immediately before and during the revolution, references to past relations with Austria re-surfaced. Dissidents and reformers supplanted the communist values using references to older traditions, namely the relationship between Austria and Hungary, and embedded in their criticisms historical and cultural symbols representing Austria in 1955 as an ideal. Consequently, the leadership and supporters of the Nagy government in Oktober 1956 referenced the Austrian model in accordance with cultural tradition to gain independence from the Soviet Union.

Based upon this complicated relationship of structuring opportunities, historical identity, and preference formation, this chapter investigates the influence that the changes in Austria in 1955 had on the movement to revolution in Hungary. To assess the evidence, the research is broken into three time frames. The first section deals with the period from 1953 to 1955 in which the opening public space under Imre Nagy clashed with the return to Stalinization led by Mátyás Rákosi in January 1955, creating the environment for considerable domestic unrest. The second part begins wit the completion of the Austrian State Treaty that epitomized the policy of "peaceful coexistence" and ends with the impact of Nikita Khrushchev's "secret speech" on Rákosi's regime in Hungary. The contradiction between the liberalization of international relations and the hard-liner approach to domestic politics presented opportunities for regime critics in Hungary to use foreign policy initiatives to condemn Rákosi. The third section examines how regime critics framed their debates by referencing the Austrian ideal of independence, sovereignty, and neutrality. From this final section, conclusions are drawn on the importance of historic identity with regard to the policy preferences established by the Nagy government during the Revolution.

Bianca L. ADAIR: The Austrian State Treaty and Austro-Hungarian Relations, 1955-56. Die Ungarnkrise 1956 und Österreich. Erwin A. Schmidl előszavával és Edda Engelke közreműködésével. Wien; Köln; Weimar, Böhlau, 2003. 201-204. p.

The Clash Between Stalinism and "Peaceful Coexistence"

Beginning in 1955, the CPSU led by Nikita Khrushchev promoted the "peaceful coexistence" between communist and democratic states. This policy had been initiated by Malenkov to ease tensions between the polarized camps of the East and West because of the potential for nuclear war. Instead of confronting the West as Stalin had, Malenkov urged continued negotiations with the United States¹³ . Malenkov's policies became the foundation for Khrushchev's foreign policy activities during 1955. This shift in foreign policy, epitomized by the completion of the Ausrian State Treaty, provided a sense of hope for Hungarians.

By mid-April, the leadership of the Soviet Union had signaled to Austrian leaders that they were willing to discuss some basis for the completion of a treaty to end the occupation of Austria, generating considerable interest in the Hungarian press¹⁴ . The media reported that Politburo member Kliment Voroshilov had met with the Austrian delegation at its embassy in Moskow about the future of Austria¹⁵ . The following day, the press reported that the CPSU leaders agreed to remove the Red Army from Austria by 31 December 1955, signifying the end of occupation¹⁶ . Hungarians received this news warmly. In an article in Szabad Nép, the author wrote that Hungary expressed its happiness at the proposition of Ausrtia receiving independence, including a discussion of the anti-Anschluss agreement and the possibility of Austria becoming neutral¹⁷ . A subsequent article provided the Hungarian public with its first glimpse of the details of the State Treaty and neutrality discussed in a summit on Austian independence¹⁸ . On May 13, Szabad Nép declared that the Soviet Union, the United States, France and Britain had agreed on the independence of a democratic Austria¹⁹ . The agreement established a free and independent country that Chancellor Raab assured radio audiences "wanted to live in peace and friendship with all neighboring countries and beyond, with all the countries of the world."²⁰

This agreement also included the evacuation of occupying troops by the end of 1955²¹ , news that brought hope to Hungarians. The provision within the 1947 Treaty of Peace was clear: The Red Army had remained in Hungary to maintain the lines of communication with troops in Austria²² . With a unified Austria, the purpose for the Red Army remaining in Hungary vanished, a point not lost on Hungarians. For example, Johann Szombathy, a laborer at the Rákosi Works at Csepel, stated that he had heard people "express the hope that the Soviets would have to Hungary ultimately because they [had] evacuated Austria."²³ László Cselotei, a laborer in Sopron, echoed this same sentiment. Cselotei claimed that Hungarians "rejoiced" when they learned that the Red Army would leave Austria, because they hoped that the military would then have to leave Hungary²⁴ . Yet just as the details of the Austrian State Treaty emerged, a second announcement came about the completion of the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance, or the Warsaw Pact²⁵ . Notably, until the summer 1956, few references were made in the media about the Warsaw Pact even though the Red Army never left Hungary after being stationed in border cities such as Győr, Szombathely, and Közseg (Kőszeg!) upon leaving Austria²⁶ . As a result, the removal of the Red Army from Hungary became tied directly to the evacuation of troops from austria and the legitimacy of the Warsaw Pact, discussed further below.

In the meantime, throughout the latter half of 1955, the Hungarian media continued to report on the debates in the Austrian Parliament regarding the State Treaty and the issue of neutrality. On 26 Oktober 1955, the Austrian Parliament passed legislation acknowledging neutrality and forbidding the state from becoming part of any military alliance²⁷ . Immediately after the decision, Sándor Máté wrote an article addressing the decision by providing insight into what was meant by neutrality in terms of the Swiss model; neutrality for Austria meant that it was neutral in international politics. In expressing Hungarian excitement over the neutrality status of Austria, Máté wrote that the "Hungarian people greet with special happiness neutral Austria" without the foreign troops and military bases, a "western neighbor, independent, neutral state." He underscored that the proclamation of Austrian neutrality initiated a new era in relation between the neighboring states and the opportunity for the realization of reciprocal relations in two ways. First, Austria retained national economic independence that made it immune to the boycotts and embargoes from the West, permitting it to operate outside of the confines of the Cold War and establish economic interaction with any state regardless of its ideological orientation. Second, Máté pointed out that Austrian neutrality expanded opportunities for Austrians to develop further relations with Czechoslovakia and Hungary. Because of the both of these points, the author stressed that he was sure that further relations would be cultivated between Austria and Hungary²⁸ . Relations between the states did indeed deepen, as illustrated below, at the same time that Rákosi's control over the Hungarian regime deteriorated.

While leadership of the CPSU had rejected Stalin's approach to foreign policy, the criticism in the "secret speech" in February 1956 illustrated the bankruptcy of Stalinism that had a negative impact on Rákosi's regime. The Hungarian media covered the events of the Twentieth Party Congress of the CPSU including excerpts from Khrushchev's address without the wholesale criticism launched against Stalin²⁹ .

By March, the details emerged in Társadalmi Szemle indicating that Stalin had been criticized for violating the collective leadership principle that had led to "serious mistakes" within the regime³⁰ . The leadership of the Hungarian Worker's Party attempted to distance itself from Stalinism, as evidenced in Rákosi's speech to Party activists in Heves County on 28 March 1956. But the admission that individuals like László Rajk had been innocent of the crimes for which they had been executed at the same time that an amnesty for Social Democrats was announced served to undercut further the legitimacy of Rákosi's regime³¹ . As a result, attacks against the regime and its supporters proliferated.

From Criticism to Policy Preferences

In the polarized environment in Hungary, the reformers and dissidents adopted the rhetoric of the Twentieth Congress of the CPSU to undermine the Stalinists. In doing so, these critics championed the foreign policy goals of "peaceful coexistence" to promote an independent foreign policy. These dissidents and reformers called for the removal of the Red Army from Hungary; recommended that Hungary become neutral to operate in the international community like Austria; and urged the expansion of relations between Hungary and the West, particularly with Austria.

After the Twentieth Congress of the CPSU, several recommendations emerged to bring Hungary closer to the West in general, but Austria in particular. Elek Solymos examined the changes in Hungarian foreign policy since February 1956, including a discussion of the mistakes made during the Stalinist period³² . Solymos wrote that the new path for foreign policy was based in the concept of the peaceful coexistence, including the increased development of trade relations between Hungary and western countries such as Greece, Austria, France, and Italy as well as cultural exchanges such as the Béla Bártok (Bartók!) anniversary celebrations in Paris and Vienna³³ . In short, Hungarian foreign policy had expanded to include the West, but some writers wanted even closer cooperation. For example, Domokos Varga called for the expansion of trade relations between socialist and capitalist countries, but he recommended a more "common sense and daring" solution. He encouraged the Danubian countries, namely Austria, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia, to cooperate more closely with one another on issues such as transportation on the Danube. Varga suggested that the new era of cooperation could resemble the way the whole of Switzerland came together over the usage of the Rhine³⁴ ! Despite such extreme recommendations, the Foreign Committee of the Parliament stressed the need for particular attention to be paid to the neighboring countries like Austria, Finland, Turkey, and Italy that shared historical and cultural ties with Hungary³⁵ .

Increased exchanges between Austria and Hungary also included opening borders and a visit to Vienna by Hungarian Foreign Minister Imre Horváth. During his trip in 1956, Horváth explained that relations between Austria and Hungary included developmental programs for the exchange of technology, increased cultural relations, an expansion of the tourism industry, and travel between Vienna and Budapest by airplane, an appropriate extension of the traditional relations between the people and neighboring states³⁶ . Such close cooperation was made easier with the removal of the armed border between Austria and Hungary in place since 1948³⁷ . In May 1956, the Hungarian Council of Ministers announced the decision to end the armed border on the Austrian frontier³⁸ . By early June, József David, a repoter in Győr, described the removal of the border obstacles. He observed that soldiers remained on the frontier, but that the obstacles such as barbed wire had been removed. Why had these measures been taken after seven years? David claimed that the changes had been made because the closed border was viewed as a mistake in the attempts to cultivate better relations with the West. Moreover, the removals would restore peace to the countryside, but he urged all citizens not to take on any "romantic" notions from the actions³⁹ . The policy of abandoning border obstacles extended to Hegeshalom (Hegyeshalom!), where the government announced the end of the embargo of technical exchanges with relation to agreements on water rights between Austria and Hungary⁴⁰ . From these policies, Hungarians became figuratively closer to the West and literally re-united in relations with Austria. But by October 1956, Hungarians wanted more, including the removal of the Red Army.

Between October 22 and November 1, calls for Hungary to become free and independent were tied directly to removing the Red Army from Hungarian soil. At the heart of the issue remained the legitimacy of the Warsaw Pact as the justification for the continued presence of the Red Army. Béla Gyöngyös argued that the Warsaw Pact was invalid for three reasons. First, as discussed above, the movement of Red Army troops from Austria to Hungarian border towns violated Article 22 of the 1947 Treaty of Peace that justified the presence of the Red Army in Hungary with tha "maintenance of the lines of communication with the Soviet zone of occupation in Austria."⁴¹

The end of the occupation of Austria necessitated the removal of the Red Army from Hungary. Second, Gyöngyös asserted that eastern bloc leaders had signed the Warsaw Pact under duress, thereby nullifying it as a legal document. Finally, the scholar noted that the individual who had signed the treaty, Stalinist András Hegedűs, had not acted on behalf of the Hungarian public. Because Hungarians rejected the Warsaw Pact, the treaty was invalid⁴² . Significantly, many Hungarians urged the removal of the Red Army from Hungary on legal grounds underscoring the illegitimacy of Hungarian membership in the Warsaw Pact. Nearly every revolutionary platform created between October 22 and November 1 asserted this same interest, an issue discussed openly on October 16 in a meeting led by Gyula Hay. During this meeting in Győr, one participant said that "our Soviet friends are welcome guests in Hungary" but that the military units were no longer necessary. Six days later, between 4,000 and 5,000 students attended another meeting at the Technical University in Győr, where, according to reports, the students chanted "menjen haza" (go home) to the Red Army⁴³ . Similar chants were heard in Budapest as the student marches commenced on October 23⁴⁴ .

At the same time, anti-Stalinist sentiment combined with explicit demands for Hungary to leave the eastern bloc and pursue a course similar to Austrian neutrality persisted. According to György Heltai, the Deputy Foreign Minister under Imre Nagy, he and several regime critics had discussed the issue of Hungarian neutrality to gain independence from the Soviet Union as early as 1955⁴⁵ . Imre Nagy had even referenced the idea of neutrality in his essay on the five principles of international relations completed in January 1956⁴⁶ . Heltai notes that he and Nagy discussed this essay not long after Nagy had completed it, and the meeting was the first time that he and Nagy had talked about neutrality for Hungary, albeit tentatively⁴⁷ . These private discussions were coupled with public demands for Hungarian neutrality between October 22 and November 1. For example, the Hungarian national Committee demanded : "Hungary declare neutrality like Austria."⁴⁸ The Law Faculty at Eötvös Loránd University made the exact same demand only two days later⁴⁹ . In a joint declaration by the Smallholders' and Peasant Parties, both leaderships recommended that Hungary follow in the footsteps of their Austrian neighbor and declare neutrality⁵⁰ . Similar calls for neutrality, many specifying the Austrian model, proliferated between October 22 and November 1. On November 1, Péter Kende wrote an editorial summarized this collective call on the leadership to declare Hungary neutral just like its neighbor Austria. He also included the demand for the removal of Hungary from the Warsaw Pact to allow Hungary to cultivate a neutral and independent policy towards the West⁵¹ . That same afternoon, Imre Nagy officially removed Hungary from the Warsaw Pact and declared it a neutral country.

Bianca L. ADAIR: The Austrian State Treaty and Austro-Hungarian Relations, 1955-56. Die Ungarnkrise 1956 und Österreich. Erwin A. Schmidl előszavával és Edda Engelke közreműködésével. Wien; Köln; Weimar, Böhlau, 2003. 206-213. p.