Catherine C. Nielsen Neutrality vs. Neutralism. Austrian Neutrality and the 1956 Hungarian Crisis

Austrian Neutrality and the 1956 Hungarian Uprising

From the beginning of her independence, Austria constantly had to defend herself against accusation of non-neutral acts from the East. She was criticized for the negative Austrian press (having a "Cold War Haltung") about the Soviet Union and the East and for allowing Radio Free Europa (RFE) to operate on Austrian soil. The Austrians were also accused of allowing the use of their territory and airspace for U.S. military purposes¹ . The Americans were in fact violating Austrian airspace in Tyrol in spite of repeated Austrian protests² . There were also several instances of U.S. propaganda balloons being launched from Germany over U.S. territory, and in some cases even crashing on Austrian territory³ . With regards to the criticism of the Austrian press, the Austrian government responded that a free press was part of a neutral, free and democratic state, and, therefore, the government had no control over what was being printed. Though they refuted these charges, the Austrians were still worried about the constant Soviet accusations. However, when they brought their concerns to the attention of the U.S., the Americans advised that they ignore them, saying that to acknowledge them would simply raise their propaganda value⁴ .

Though Austria was neutral, she could not be considered neutralist. She remained Western oriented throughout the Cold War and, prior to the 1956 Hungarian crisis, engaged in some acts that could be considered non-neutralist in nature. One example in particular was Austrian compliance with the U.S. Escapee Program and U.S. exploitation of refugees⁵ . An 8 Oct 1956 U.S. Embassy report from Vienna on Austrian and American refugee policies stated that the Austrian approach was "fully in line with current U.S. objectives." The report further stated that:

[Radio Free Europa has] enjoyed unrestricted access to newly arriving refugees. Despite a continued campaign in the Communist press urging the Austrian government to expel RFE, to which was added genuine Austrian irritation over incidents connected with balloons landing on Austrian territory, RFE has so far been able without interference to exploit propaganda values among refugees in Austria⁶ .

In addition to being used for propaganda purposes, the refugees were also exploited for intelligence purposes. With covert assistance from the Austrian authorities, some refugees were sent to the United States Air Force Europe debriefing center in Munich and later returned to Austria. On a more selective basis, refugees were sent to Frankfurt "for exploitation by the entire intelligence community⁷ .

Austrian security authorities are aware of both programs and cooperate at least passively. Occasional defectors or refugees of significant political intelligence interest have been made directly available to U.S. authorities by the Austrians and their prompt departure from Austria has been facilitated by the Ministry of the Interior⁸ .

There were some concerns among Austrian officials that the U.S. exploitation of refugees would be problematic for Austrian neutrality. The Americans believed this explained the Austrian "willingness to accommodate repatriation activities by the Soviets" since they felt they could not take a firm stand against the Soviet Union as they were accommodating U.S. wishes⁹ .

In addition to the refugee issue, the Austrians also expelled the World Federation of Trade Unions froms Vienna and refused to grant visas to World Peace Conference delegates. The U.S. saw both of these organisations as pro-Communist, and the Americans had repeatedly criticized the Austrians for allowing them in Vienna¹⁰ .

In October 1956, Austria was suddenly faced with a crisis on her borders and the first serious test of her neutrality. Though the Austrians sided with the West during the Hungarian uprising and condemned Soviet actions in Hungary, the government also took steps to attempt to maintain at least the appearance of a neutralist policy. There was concern, particularly among the Austrian population, that Soviet tanks would not stop at the border. During the uprising there were even rumors of a planned Soviet invasion of Austrian territory to stop the flow of refugees into Austria¹¹ . The Austrians were not willing to test the Soviets by engaging in any blatantly un-neutral acts:

Unser Schutz liegt in unserer Neutralität. Die Abt[eilung für] Pol[itische Fragen] darf nochmals vor Kundgebunden des Parlaments warnen, die in Moskau einen Eindruck erwecken könnten, als ob auch mit dem Aufstand in Ungarn unsere Neutralität hinweggefegt wäre¹² .

At the beginning of the Hungarian uprising, the Austrian government took several steps to prove that they were indeed a neutral state¹³ . A special session of the Ministry of the Interior was called by Oskar Helmer (Raab was in Germany at the time and Figl in Strasbourg). The decision was made at this session that concrete measures needed to be taken to secure the border, but they also recognized that Austria had a duty to take in refugees¹⁴ . On October 28, a special meeting of the Ministerrat was held. The Austrian government decided to send a message to the Soviet Union asking them to assist in ending the bloodshed and stating that "re-establishment of freedom on the basis of human rights will strength en peace in Europe."¹⁵ The message was sent to the Soviets as well as the other former occupying powers. They decided that the message had to embody Austria's concept of neutrality¹⁶ .

During the first days of the uprising, the border between Austria and Hungary remained fairly open. Eventually, the Austrians took steps to control the border in order to prevent "entry into Hungary from Austria of elements who might give Soviets grounds for charging violation of Austrian neutrality¹⁷ . On October 30, the military attaches from all four former occupation powers were invited to the border to inspect Austrian border control. The Austrians wanted to show the four powers, particularly the Soviets, that Austria was indeed neutral and that no military supplies or military aid would cross the border into Hungary, only food and medical supplies¹⁸ . All refugees were allowed into Austria provided they lay down their weapons. Those who refused were disarmed and taken into custody¹⁹ . This policy also applied to Hungarian or Soviet soldiers who crossed the border in pursuit of refugees. If they refused to stop or disarm, they would be fired upon²⁰ . On 13 Nomber 1956, a special committee of the Ministerrat was formed to deal with the refugee issue further²¹ .

In spite of these measures, the Austrians faced constant accusations by Soviet officials and the East Bloc press of "un-neutral" acts. Reports in both the Soviet and Austrian Communist Party press (Volksstimme) as well as radio reports coming from Moscow accused the Austrians of allowing weapons to be transported into Austria under the guise of Red Cross aid. In some cases, Soviet officials even gave the serial numbers of the planes that were to have been carrying these arms²² . Austria was also accused of helping Hungarian émigrés and former Fascists cross the border into Hungary to assist in the "counterrevolution."There were rumors of Hungarian refugees who received military training from Americans and then were smuggled back into Hungary²³ . The Austrian government repeatedly denied such allegations but also stated that they could not always control the acts of individual citizens. In response to Austrian protests, the Soviet Ambassador to Austria, Lapin, "referred to [the] Aust[rian] press, commotion on border and refugee activities and mildly warned Aust[rian]s not pour oil on the flames."²⁴ In spite of previous statements to the effect that the Austrian government had no control over the press and that a free press was part of a democratic state, the 4 November 1956 issue of the Volksstimme was confiscated on the grounds that it was too incendiary²⁵ . This led to an outcry by both the Austrian Communist Party and the Soviet press.

Austria used the opportunity to invoke its neutrality on 30 October 1956 when former Hungarian President Ferenc Nagy arrived in Vienna's Schwechat airport. The Austrians were concerned that his arrival might cause unrest among Hungarian émigrés and refugees. They were also worried how Nagy's appearance in Austria would be interpreted by the Soviets. Nagy was refused entry into Austria and later left by train for Switzerland that same day²⁶ .

Austria found other reasons to exercise its neutral status. For example, during the crisis they were no longer willing to cooperate with U.S. actions with regards to the exploitation of the refugees for propaganda and intelligence purposes. The Austrians were prepared to accept refugees and stated repeatedly that it was their moral duty as a neutral to do so. However, there was also concern over the political and economic burden the refugees would place on Austria. Economically, the Austrians could not afford to support the mass influx of refugees from Hungary (by early 1957, over 170,000²⁷ ) Politically, there was the potential for unrest among the refugees in the camps as well as for accusations from the Soviets of un-neutral activities. The Austrians immediately sent out a plea to the United Nations as well as to the West for economic and material assistance in caring for the refugees as well as help in moving the refugees out of Austria as soon as possible. Many states recognized the uncomfortable situation the Austrians were in and responded by giving aid to the Austrians, agreeing to accept refugees and, in some cases, speeding up the immigration process and upping immigration quotas to assist in the removal of refugees²⁸ .

Austria also took measures to ensure that only authorized personnel were allowed over the border into Hungary²⁹ . They were worried that unless the border was controlled, Hungarian émigrés or sympathetic Austrians might try traveling to Budapest to assist with the uprising. Finally, a moratorium on visas to foreign passport holders was put in place³⁰ .

From the American viewpoint, they did not believe that "there was any likelihood of other than minor border incidents." The Soviets knew that an attack on Austria would raise tensions with the West and could possibly "result in a showdown between East and West."³¹ But they understood the Austrian concerns and the steps they were taking during the tense days of October and November 1956. The fact that Austria condemned Soviet actions and continued to take in refugees was a sign that Austria was still western oriented. However, much to the dismay of the Americans, Austrian caution with regards to its neutrality continued well after the crisis. In February 1957 the Soviets put forward a UN resolution "condemning the 'subversive activities' of the US" in Eastern Europe and calling on them to cease their interventionism there. The U.S. knew that the resolution would be voted down, but they wanted the largest "no" vote possible as a show of solidarity against the Soviet Union. Though the U.S. expected the Austrians to support their position, Vienna instructed the Austrian delegation to the UN "to abstain, at the same time giving it discretion to be absent on a roll-call vote."³² The Austrian delegation later explained to the Americans that they were "convinced Soviets looking for any pretext to make more trouble for Vienna" and wanted to avoid damaging the already fragile relationship with the Soviet Union and the East Bloc³³ .

In spring 1957, the UN planned to send a delegation to Austria to visit the refugee camps and interview the refugees. The Austrians had initially voted for the committee, but at the last minute became concerned that the committee would cause disturbances in the camps and be turned into a propaganda ploy by the West. They wanted to prevent any hearings by the committee with refugees, either public or private. In talks with U.S. Ambassador to Austria Thompson, Foreign Minister Figl informed him that the Austrians:

Had voted for the UN resolution in Nov[ember] to send observers to Hung[ary] and had agreed to Commission coming here observe treatment of Hungarian refugees. Stated Aust[rian]s still prepared to receive commission but are opposed to setting up spectacular tribunal here. Pointed out Aust[rian] conception of UN Commission's work was one of quiet fact gathering but had obtained impressions from demands made by Commission for space, simultaneous interpreting equipment and personnel requirements, that Commission intended to put on spectacle...Figl stated that in view of difficult relations with East and ever greater pressure put on Aust[rian]s, spectacular performance by UN commission tended to jeopardize Aust[rian] neutrality³⁴ .

Thompson warned Figl that Austria's refusal to allow the interviews could have negative effects "since [the] Sov[iet]s would interpret this as sign of weakness and increase pressure while West would lose respect for Aust[ria]," and that such an action "would be interpreted in free world as drift towards neutralism and yielding to Russian pressure."³⁵ The Austrians ultimately allowed the Committee into the camps, but only after assurances that the UN Committee would conduct private interviews and avoid any publicity³⁶ .

The actions that the Austrians took during and in the period after the events in Hungary in October and November 1956 illustrate that, though westward leaning, when faced with a true test of their neutrality and with the threat of a Soviet invasion, they were not willing to take any chances. They strove to put a policy in place that at least on the surface was neutralist and was aimed at refuting Soviet attacks of "un-neutral" acts.

Catherine C. NIELSEN: Neutrality vs. Neutralism: Austrian Neutrality and the 1956 Hungarian Crisis. Die Ungarnkrise 1956 und Österreich. Erwin A. Schmidl előszavával és Edda Engelke közreműködésével. Wien; Köln; Weimar, Böhlau, 2003. 225-233. p.

??

??

??

??

1