|
Vásárhelyi, Miklós: Complete disarray at an international press conference "How did the one government-level international press conference of the revolution come about?"
"The first requirement was the sanction of Imre Nagy. It wasn't easy, but he consented in the end. We agreed to call for for four or five o'clock on Saturday, November 3. I phoned Péter Várkonyi, who was head or deputy of the Foreign Ministry Press Department and had the list of foreign correspondents, and I asked him to send out the invitations. This he gladly did with great accuracy. I emphasize that he did it gladly, because the Foreign Ministry didn't have much to do during those days. It seemed that Nagy had taken on foreign affairs as well, with György Heltai and Pál Félix doing the daily tasks alongside him. In practice, the Foreign Ministry apparatus was being bypassed, or rather doing what Heltai and Félix told them. Now at last there was a task and Várkonyi organized this very well. I alerted the film newsreel and some leading people in the Hungarian press as well. As expected, there was huge anticipation of the press conference, which would be the first time Nagy met the foreign press as prime minister.
"People had already started to gather when Losonczy suddenly asked me to go in and see the old man. Nagy told me that he'd just received news from Barcs, from the news agency MTI, that the Chinese had also altered their view of the events. This had produced a complete different situation, and under the circumstances, the press conference should be held by Géza Losonczy and Zoltán Tildy. I was bitterly disappointed. He, better than any of us, sensed the importance of the open change on China's part, but I had no idea and still have no idea why the conclusion from that had to be that he shouldn't hold the press conference. Interestingly, Losonczy and Tildy behaved with great discipline, accepting that they had to take on that task, though quite unprepared for it, and knowing that this would be a very bad start, causing huge disappointment."
"You said the Chinese had also altered their position. What information did you have that the Soviets had altered theirs?"
"The tone of the Soviet press had changed on Friday. Articles on the danger of counterrevolution and restoration began to reappear. You could sense the wind had changed. But this wasn't an open change. I said 'also' not for that reason, but because the Chinese joined those who had taken that view all along-the Czechs, East Germans, Romanians, Bulgarians.
"So those were the antecedents to the press conference. Three of us, I think, went into the Hunters Hall. It was packed and a lot of people had been left outside. The Foreign Ministry had provided the interpreters. Of course, when Losonczy and Tildy went in instead of Nagy, there was a murmur of surprise and frustration from the hall. The briefing began under a very unlucky star and it didn't go well. We'd agreed earlier with Nagy that he'd make a statement at the press conference, as was customary on such occasions, and he'd obviously prepared to do so. That would have set the whole tone. Tildy and Losonczy, on the other hand, weren't prepared for that, and quite wrongly, neither of them thought to do it. They could have discussed in five minutes what to include. Instead, I opened the event, announcing that Imre Nagy was unable to be present because of other commitments and two state ministers had come in his stead. After greeting those present, I invited questions. You could hardly have prepared and organized a press occasion worse. I don't remember the correspondents of important papers asking anything at all. They didn't take the matter seriously. Instead, all kinds of lesser figures put quite inessential questions. There was complete disarray.
"It can be said plainly of this press conference that it was unsuccessful, despite the historic moment. It degenerated to a general low standard. Although Nagy had presented us with an unexpected situation, the responsibility was mine alone. I should have worked out in a couple of minutes what to do in that situation and I hadn't work out anything at all."
The life-interview made by András B. Hegedűs and Gyula Kozák in 1985-7 is No. 3 in the Oral History Archive.
|
