(XVI. International Oral History Conference. Between Past and Future: Oral History, Memory and Meaning)
Prague, 2010 July

The Hungarian revolution which broke out on 23 October 1956 was suppressed by Soviet troops on 4 November, then a rival government was created in Moscow under the leadership of János Kádár. The Kádár leadership established its authority by reprisals, executions and severe prison sentences against participants in the revolution, and maintained it by tacit social consensus, a so-called soft dictatorship. The basis for the consensus was relative prosperity, in exchange for which society left the past alone; the revolution and reprisals were taboo. The 229 political prisoners executed between 1956 and 1961, among them the prime minister of the revolution Imre Nagy, were interred in secret in unmarked graves, their relatives could not bury their dead for three decades. Those sentenced to imprisonment, more than twenty thousand, were forced to live with harmful discrimination after their release, as were their family members. The memories of '56 and the condemned were only preserved in the circles of friends and the immediate family.

By the eighties it was becoming increasing obvious that the basis of the consensus was breaking down, economic development had come to a halt, the customary standard of living could no longer be maintained, even with foreign credit, and the attempts by the authorities to erase memories had also been unsuccessful. Widows, orphans and companions were increasingly demanding a worthy burial for the executed and rehabilitation for the condemned. Their efforts were supported by the democratic opposition, revived at the turn of the seventies-eighties. Open questioning of the Kádár interpretation of the 1956 revolution, which gave the system quasi-legitimacy, was on the increase. Ever more writings critical of the system appeared in the samizdats, and public disputes also proliferated. Taboos were replaced by remembrances and an urgent need to uncover the past.

The prestige of János Kádár, the emblematic leader of the age, had waned both at home and abroad. Károly Grósz became party chief secretary in May 1988, and though he could overtake his predecessor neither in political power nor in domestic and foreign recognition, he was feared for a while due to his rhetoric. The single party system leadership could not stand in the way of the civilian organisations, or the establishment of independent trade unions and new parties. Due to the conflicts forming between the conservatives and adherents of reform in the state party high command, an increasing number of members also urged for changes.

The Committee for Historical Justice was formed by thirty seven people in a private flat in Budapest in May 1988. The founders were '56-ers, ex-prisoners, and relatives of those executed. They drafted their demands in the challenge: Historical justice! They demanded worthy burial for the executed '56-ers interred in secret in unmarked graves, rehabilitation for the executed and imprisoned, and the release of confidential documents for research purposes. They read their challenge on Radio Free Europe.

The party leadership did not respond publicly to the challenge of the CHJ, but in secret they began a quest for the graves of those executed in the Imre Nagy trial. On 16 June 1988, the thirtieth anniversary of the execution of Imre Nagy and his associates, and on 23 October, the anniversary of the break-out of the revolution, street commemorations were broken up, but public commemorations held on a smaller scale were not interrupted.

The process begun in 1988 had become unstoppable by 1989; the HSWP leaders could not repel the attacks on multiple fronts. They yielded on the matters of the unburied dead, evaluation of the revolution, rights of publicity, assembly and association, the multiparty system, the right to strike, the Soviet troops stationed in Hungary, the sealed western border, Hungarians living beyond the frontier, and many other issues taboo in the Kádár system. In January of 1989, the authorities changed the evaluation of the revolution pronounced thirty years before, and according to their new interpretation a popular uprising had occurred in Hungary in 1956 and not a counter-revolution. The government approved the plan for the burial of Imre Nagy and his associates, and their exhumation began at the end of March in plot 301 of the new Rákoskeresztúr public cemetery. The press provided continuous information on the events. In spring, a national daily paper launched a series of articles on the revolution and the reprisals. In February an investigation of the show trials was ordered, in May a list of persons condemned to death and executed after the revolution was published by the Ministry of Justice. In a statement of 14 June, the Executive Council paid tribute to "all the victims of the 1956 popular uprising and national tragedy".

Whilst the majority of the CHJ leaders and the relatives of the martyrs initially stressed the personal character of the burial, they reinforced the historical, political function of the newly formed opposition organisations and parties. As a result of a series of negotiations between the CHJ, the HSWP leadership and the head of government, a decision was made to lay out Imre Nagy and his associates executed in the case in the most public manner on Heroes' Square in Budapest, and also to bid a final farewell to all the martyrs of '56 in a sixth, symbolic coffin. They would then be laid to eternal rest in the cemetery in the presence of a narrower circle of relatives and fellow-sufferers. It was also decided that the state party would not be represented at the funeral, but the government and the National Assembly would be, and the radio and television would broadcast the events live.

On June 1989 on Heroes Square in Budapest, several hundred thousand attended to pay their respects. It was a day of tribute and dignity in Hungarian history. It was when the Kádár age came to an end.
On June 6, in negotiations on rehabilitation in the Supreme Court, Nagy Imre and his associates were cleared of the charges of 1958. Those present were then informed of the death of János Kádár. A search for the graves of the rest of those executed was made possible with the cooperation of the Ministry of Justice and the funeral undertakers, as was their burial according to the wishes of relatives. Historical research was also begun. The demands drafted in the first CHJ declaration had been fulfilled.

Based on life interviews in the Budapest Oral History Archives, the most important recollections of the period from the formation of the CHJ till the funeral on 16 June 1989 are presented, that fight on multiple fronts, during which personal bereavement developed into a political struggle and a demonstration of the burial of the system.
A continual weakening of the Kádár system had already been recognised at the beginning of the eighties by the former fifty-sixers who belonged to the Imre Nagy circle, and where possible they exploited this to push the limits.

"We have been producing the Oral History Archive since 1981, and whether it was said or unsaid, we have tried to do fifty six interviews first and foremost. It was our obsession for thirty years that not only could a change of regime not be produced without the idealism of '56, but neither could reforms, as '56 was lying on the stomach of the nation, and it had to be digested. A new evaluation of '56 seemed essential for carrying out the desired exhaustive reforms." (Hegedűs¹)
"On the thirtieth anniversary in 1986, we held a roundtable conference on '56. I made statements in foreign newspapers, and declared openly what the situation was with '56. I also stressed that my fellow sufferers and I would fight for a correct evaluation of '56, for its general, major political goals, for a search for the graves of the murdered, martyred fifty-sixers and for their proper burial. I also launched the procedure for my rehabilitation at that time. I handed in a petition to the Supreme Court, in which I requested a re-examination of the 1958 judgement. I made several more attempts in '88, which were rejected even at the end of that year." (Vásárhelyi²)

"I wrote a number of letters, to the Ministry of Justice and the Ministry of the Interior, asking them to tell me where Pál Maléter was buried. I received the same reply from both places, that they were unable to inform me." (Mrs Maléter³)

The weakening of Kádár's authority was also perceived within the party leadership. They also knew that if the truth came to light, that Kádár had promised impunity to Imre Nagy and his associates in 1956, then arrested them and pushed for them to be sentenced to death, it would mean the end of his power.
"In around '88 I came to realise that János Kádár was an aging, weary man, so things had to be changed. Although he had welcomed the appearance of Gorbachev in '85, he could not really make the rapid changes he dictated. Kádár hung onto power and was afraid that a lot of things would come to light. And the idea of raking up '56 was gradually increasing in strength." (Szűrös⁴)

In 1988, a group of fifty-sixers took decisive steps in the interest of rehabilitating the revolution and the condemned. They recognised the opportunity for compelling the weakening authorities to grant concessions. By forming the CHJ they united a number of the fifty-sixers, and now they did not make requests as individuals, but demands as a group.

"It came up several times that we should do something. First of all that we should collect signatures and send them into the party central committee, because we must exact exhumation, reburial and personal rehabilitation from the authorities. Then we thought we should found a committee, the members of which could only be the widows of those imprisoned or executed. We first discussed forming the CHJ at András B. Hegedűs' place, our conversations generally took place there. He was willing to "accommodate" us for this in his large flat, which was not without danger at that time." (Vásárhelyi)

"I was happy that I knew the people who came. I knew that their position was clear, and they dared to stand by their opinions. I was also willing to come clean here, because I realised that the general political atmosphere was such, that they could no longer use force against us." (Zimányi⁵)

"We had arrived at 1988, when Alíz Halda6 asked if I would be willing to sit on a committee, which would only to open to those who had suffered imprisonment for '56. I accepted, naturally. All the more because my daughter had married an Australian in 1985 and left home. I was alone and did not have to accept responsibility for anyone else." (Mrs Maléter)

 The CHJ declaration was first read out publicly, by András B. Hegedűs, at a politology meeting held in a provincial town. Two days later at an HSWP party meeting, the reformers were victorious and Kádár formally lost his power. Although the CHJ challenge could not yet appear in the Hungarian media, no reprisals were taken when it was read on Radio Free Europe. Several hundred joined in with the challenge, which clearly proved that in spite of the decades of silence, society had not forgotten.

"The first CHJ challenge was read out on Radio Free Europe on 5 June 1988, in the afternoon, after the five o'clock news. They gave my name and telephone number. (Two of us, Alíz and I, gave our names and address, so people could get in contact with the CHJ through us.) The broadcast had not even finished before the telephone rang, and from then on came phone calls, letters, and people even came in person. They came and told their stories." (Mrs Maléter)

Many of the Hungarian emigrants living abroad preserved the memory of the revolution and the martyrs, and protested against the Kádár system in various ways. They supported the CHJ from its inception, and also helped by making their efforts known abroad. In 1988, on the 30th anniversary of the execution of Imre Nagy and his associates, on the initiative of the Hungarian émigrés a symbolic grave was dedicated to the memory of Imre Nagy and his associates in the Pere-Lachaise cemetery in Paris.

"In May of 1988, before Károly Grósz visited America as prime minister, on the initiative of Representative Frank Horton several dozen representatives approached the Hungarian prime ministry by letter. They reminded him that the time had come to mark the unmarked graves of Imre Nagy and the other executed freedom fighters, to ensure worthy respects were paid, and thus to settle the issue which had attracted lively international attention over the years. Károly Grósz replied that he would retain his opinion on the fight for freedom and the executed prisoners, but in the interest of human rights they would ensure the graves were accessible." (Gereben⁷)

"Our chief goal was to seek publicity. We wrote articles in foreign papers, I made statements - not just as Miklós Vásárhelyi, but as chairman of the CHJ. It was our intention to force change under pressure from international public opinion. Károly Grósz' trip to America greatly contributed to changing the whole situation." (Vásárhelyi)

"There were a great many of us in the Pere-Lachaise cemetery at the dedication of the symbolic grave. There are just fine, uplifting and wonderful memories. It was fantastic! I was also interviewed at a press conference. They asked me about my memories of Pál Maléter, and the words just poured out of me. It was quite fabulous that after so much suppression, taboo and secrecy, we could finally talk in public about what we could only talk about at home before, with just a few select people." (Mrs Maléter)
It was important for Grósz for his American trip to be a success, so he had already made a decision on the issue of tribute before his departure. On the direction of the party leadership he had charged a young officer from the Ministry of the Interior to mark the resting place of Imre Nagy and his companions in the overgrown plot 301 which concealed the unmarked graves. It emerged that even the authorities did not know where they had been buried after the execution. After an investigation lasting several months, the young officer ascertained that the bodies had been interred in the prison yard after the execution on 16 June 1958. In 1961 they were transferred to the cemetery, where they were buried in secret under false names. Two bodies, those of Pál Maléter and Miklós Gimes, were entombed in one pit.

"When I was given the assignment, I knew it would be darned difficult. I had professional ambition, though, and I was determined to find them. On the other hand, I was incredibly nervous. Although I worked in a place like that, I did not know much about 1956. When a friend of mine started to do research for his candidate's dissertation, he told me that this counter revolution did not look like what we had been told; there was no conspiracy, no organisation. From 1985-86 he told me specific cases almost every day, about the innocent who had been executed. He was almost ill with this, and it made me ill too. I'm not joking. Something inside us collapsed. As I started getting involved, and the circumstances under which they had been buried came to light, I imagined what it would have been like if I had got into the same situation, and my parents or my brother. I ended up with the attitude emotionally, that I was totally obliged to find those people, and if possible to help others to be found too." (Pajcsics⁸)

In December of 1988, the relatives were received by the state secretary for justice in order to discuss the funeral. Although the Ministry of the Interior investigation had located the grave sites and the fact of re-interment with almost complete certainty, the relatives were not told the truth.

"I don't know exactly what was going on in the background, but I know that as a result of the work of the CHJ leaders they started discussions with us. We went separately to the first appointment. I told them how many times I had tried, and how many rejections I had received. I was most perplexed by the very polite voice, the state secretary was terribly accommodating. Whatever I said, I got a positive response. They said they would agree to the exhumation, they would look for them, but this was a huge job, and even they didn't know. So there was a lot of mystification. Then, everyone would be able to bury his relative individually." (Mrs Maléter)

"We encountered constant resistance from the middle authorities, never openly, but where they could, they held things up. At the beginning there was not even a list of names. They said they had no idea who was buried where, they themselves were completely uninformed, they would be happy to help, but... The tale was that in winter everything was frozen over, but spring came, the ground had thawed, there was no physical barrier to starting the work, but they still dragged and delayed. There were minor impediments too, in connection with the international situation. At first Kádár, then when he conked out his successors, mainly Grósz, were counting on Gorbachev coming to nothing, and in the Soviet Union comrades would get the upper hand who did not want this whole procedure. So they thought there was no need to rush things. We considered the process to be unstoppable, with or without Gorbachev, with or without cooperation, things would go forward." (Vásárhelyi)

The process really was unstoppable. The exhumation took place at the end of March and however much the authorities would have liked to restrict the publicity, they could no longer stand in the way of the illegalities, the extent of the reprisals and the impious interment of those executed coming to light.
"The role of the CHJ was to demonstrate with some sort of political presence that the exhumation was a supervised act. We excluded the press by mutual agreement, which raised a lot of indignation. There were two reasons for excluding the press. On the one hand, we did not want to subject the relatives to being photographed while the bones of their fathers and husbands were being removed one by one from the pit - which is very harrowing, but surprisingly you get used to it - and the pictures then appear the next day in the newspapers. The then incipient tabloid press overran the concrete fence of plot 301, and took photos through the holes. We made statements every day, so we did not exclude the press by refusing to give publicity, we just did not want them swarming all over the place. But there was also a political reason for this. This cat and mouse game with the authorities - where we were still the mouse at the time - was unpredictable, and we did not want to endanger either the humanitarian or the political success of the action. If there had been a worldwide sensation, the Grósz leadership could have said, no more." (Hegedűs)
"You would have thought that when the coffin was opened, there would be some clothing or scraps, but there was not, everything had perished. There was enough horror, the remnants of pitch paper, the wires. His hands wired together, his legs crossed, because he clearly did not fit into the box, his head tipped to one side, shoes on his feet. Those wires and the two shoes were dreadful. Common sense told me that this was the end of not knowing where he is, I would not live my life without ever finding out where he is, things are now cleared up. But in the depths of my soul I had the feeling it would be awful to find out, because it was the last thread. It they didn't find him here, then he must be somewhere, so perhaps... And then there was the certainty, it's over." (Mrs Maléter)

"Finally there was the excavation, the five skeletons they were looking for turned up in four graves. The CHJ held an international press conference on 6 April. This was an important event, and it also caused conflict. The prelude to this was that Imre Mécs⁹ and one or two of his friends had insisted most strongly that not only these five bodies should be buried in physical reality, but another five too. He sent a forceful telegram to Prime Minister Miklós Németh in the name of the CHJ, in which he demanded five more exhumations by name, with which we naturally agreed. I don't know why the justice and state apparatus made a prestige issue out of this, but it's a fact the they were then unwilling to open up any more graves, and the cooperation which had been good until then was suspended. On the last day, when it was raining as well, the penal authorities, clearly on orders from above, eliminated the infrastructure within minutes, and banned the medical experts from taking part in the press conference. We held the press conference in spite of this, and told people what had happened." (Hegedűs)

 After the exhumation, conflicts were growing on several fronts. The CHJ leaders realised that their initiative had outgrown the '88 demands. In the spring of '89, the burial of the '56-ers was not merely an issue for the families and fellow-sufferers affected, but for the whole nation. Aware of their moral and political responsibility, they adapted to the new situation. The Grósz party leadership was afraid of publicity, of the funeral becoming a political demonstration, so they still wanted to restrict the publicity. Recognising the historical situation, the young Prime Minister Miklós Németh supported the CHJ's approach, the public funeral organised by civilians, and announced his intention to pay his respects at the biers on behalf of the government. The CHJ leaders accepted this, but several of the members of the organisation, which had swollen in the meantime, attacked them for this. The opposition organisations and the newly formed parties also requested a part in the arrangements. Finally on 16 June 1989, the whole nation bowed its head before the martyrs, and together with them, buried a historical age.
"This funeral could only have been held on 16 June 1989, not at any other time. A section of the CHJ did not want the funeral on 16 June at first, but in April, in plot 301, in the presence of several hundred or a few thousand people. At first it was also my view that the political winds were favourable then, and it was not certain that things would be so good on 16 June. An about-face was definitely in the air. There was a dichotomy throughout, as to what was in the foreground: political struggle or family bereavement. Undoubtedly those who insisted on the 16 June date were right, because 16 June thus became a symbol. It would have been a mistake to rush the funeral in April." (Hegedűs)

"The funeral was self-humiliation and self-discredit for the past system. Every moral and political basis slid out from under them. I can understand why a section of the executive and party leadership were averse to, and specifically against the whole thing, but it is all the more to the credit of those who supported us in this. There was a significant and prestigious group within the party leadership that we were in contact with and could dialogue with. I got a lot of criticism for this, and the accusation was obvious, that - as an old commie, my heart was drawing me back. I had no such emotional ties, I was just convinced politically, that if we wanted to achieve a result - taking the international situation into account, of course, which was working in our favour - then it was vital to find partners in this matter at the highest level." (Vásárhelyi)

"There was a powerful dispute within the CHJ. Namely, on the matter of the five coffins and the sixth coffin. This meant that certain people expressed the thought that it was only about communists, and everything was happening in the interest of communists. Then there was the idea of putting a sixth coffin there as a symbol, in memorial of all those who had been executed. This was accepted by everyone." (Zimányi)

"Opinions were finally unified on taking them to Heroes' Square, and it was quite clear that agreement must be made with the authorities. After some opposition, the CHJ agreed to this. We don't negotiate with murderers, we don't speak to them - there were also voices like these. Three of us were given authorisation to negotiate with the party leadership. In the party CC, they just reiterated: no, no, no. Miklós Németh grasped the situation at once, and said that cooperation must be established. Essentially, Heroes' Square was accepted as the location. Miklós Németh and Mátyás Szűrös raised the matter that naturally they also wanted to take part in the funeral, and form a guard of honour. To which I said at once that I accept, that's fine. Once again this raised certain objections in the CHJ: These murderers come here to see their victims, they have no right to be there, how could I accept this? To which I replied that if we are burying five men who were members of the communist party, then it is ridiculous to deny attendance to those who bear no responsibility at all - for one thing because of their age - and are present as representatives of the government. And in addition, I feel that it does not detract from or overshadow the political significance of the whole thing, but rather enhances it, if the prime minister and the chairman of the House take part." (Vásárhelyi)

"I was one of the guard of honour on Heroes' Square. I was standing there just as Miklós Németh and his team came to lay their wreath. They stood by my feet, they bowed, and it was unbelievable reparation. It was perfectly proper for them to march with the people. They took the lead in the triumphal procession, it was an essential feature. If the country was serious about not having civil war or a showdown, but that the truth must be told, and telling the truth was a kind of catharsis from where a new start could be made, then it was quite natural that Miklós Németh had to come, he had to bow his head, and stand in silence, and cope with the fact that a hundred thousand people were watching him. And the hundred thousand people had to observe respectfully, how a grown man bowed his head, and from then on spoke differently from how he had before." (Orbán¹⁰)

"I had no idea what power a sound cannon had. I saw several thousand people, faceless, after the list of the executed had been read out, every name a hammer blow to the heart and to history. It was awe-inspiring. I had never had such a burden on my soul. Or such responsibility. I felt that everything had slipped from my hands; everything was in God's hands, as was I. That something amazingly great was happening, like this was truly the last cathartic moment in the political development of Hungary, this was the breakthrough with its own mute power and terrible discipline." (Göncz¹¹)

"I consider 16 June 1989 to be a highly significant event. This funeral represents a great turnaround in the history of Hungary and Europe. It was unprecedented for that party leadership and that government, which until then had held to completely different policies, to appear and actually apologise in the presence of the world. With this they totally pulverised the moral-political basis of the system. The rehabilitation of Imre Nagy meant that everything that had happened after 4 November '56 was lies. The significance of the funeral is still minimised today, but it is of no less value - though of a different form - that the Prague velvet revolution or the fall of the Berlin wall." (Vásárhelyi)

Notes
1 András B. Hegedűs (1930-2001) political economist, sociologist. University assistant lecturer in 1956 and one of the secretaries of the Petőfi circle. After suppression of the revolution, participated in intellectual resistance. Sentenced to two years imprisonment in 1959. The CHJ was formed in his flat in 1988, of which he became the secretary and later the executive vice-chairman. Chief organiser of the reburial of Imre Nagy and his fellow martyrs, founder of the Oral History Archive and then the 1956 Institute, executive director between 1991 and 99. 1956 Institute OHA, interview no. 475.2, produced by Gábor Murányi in 1992-93.

2 Miklós Vásárhelyi (1917-2001) journalist, politician. Belonged to the party opposition formed around Imre Nagy. Became the press chief of the Imre Nagy government on 1 November 1956. Was deported to Romania in November together with his family and the Imre Nagy group. Sentenced to five years imprisonment in 1958 in the Imre Nagy case.  Released in 1960. Member of the democratic opposition, one of the founders of the CHJ, was chairman until 1992. 1956 Institute OHA, interview no. 3.2, produced by Gábor Murányi in 1994.

3 Judith Gyenes (1932) librarian. Widow of the executed Pál Maléter, defence minister in the Imre Nagy government. After her husband's arrest, was dismissed from her job and worked for years as a labourer. Founder member of the CHJ. 1956 Institute OHA, interview no. 694, produced by Adrienne Molnár in 1998.

4 Mátyás Szűrös (1933) diplomat, politician. Ambassador to Berlin from 1975, then to Moscow, secretary of the HSWP CC from 1983, chairman of the National Assembly in 1989. 1956 Institute OHA, interview no. 426, produced by Pál Péter Tóth in 1991.

5 Tibor Zimányi (1922-2007) political economist. Police officer between 1945 and 48, then interned until 1960. Sentenced to five years imprisonment in 1958 for his activities during the revolution. Released in 1960. One of the founders and leaders of the CHJ and the Association of Political Prisoners. 1956 Institute OHA, interview no. 696, produced by Gábor Murányi in 1998.

6 Alíz Halda (1928-2008) educationalist, politician. Partner of the executed Miklós Gimes. One of the founders of the CHJ.

7 István Gereben (1933) geophysicist, oceanographer, publicist. Living in the USA since 1957. From the beginning of the eighties, was in close contact with the democratic opposition in Hungary. 1956 Institute OHA, interview no. 737, produced by Erika Törzsök in 2000.

8 József Pajcsics (1945) lawyer, political economist. As an employee of the investigation department in the Ministry of the Interior in 1989, he was leader of the group of detectives searching for the graves of Imre Nagy and his associates. Solicitor from 1995. 1956 Institute OHA, interview no. 261, produced by András B. Hegedűs in 1991.

9 Imre Mécs (1933) electrical engineer, politician. After suppression of the revolution, sentenced to life imprisonment. One of the founders of the CHJ.

10 György Orbán (1950) lawyer, bookseller. His father was sentenced to 10 years imprisonment in 1958, his family was also slandered. 1956 Institute OHA, interview no. 693, produced by Adrienne Molnár in 1997.

11 Árpád Göncz (1922) agronomist, politician. In 1956, collaborated in getting the writings of Imre Nagy to the West, negotiated with the Soviet and Hungarian leaders with a delegate of the Indian president as mediator. Sentenced to life imprisonment in 1958. Released in 1963. Member of the democratic opposition, founder of the CHJ, President of the Republic of Hungary between 1990 and 2000. 1956 Institute OHA, interview no. 2.2, produced by András B. Hegedűs in 1990.